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Australian Defence procurement is making important steps with the idea of minimum viable capability—acquiring not an ideal system but something that’s good enough to meet the immediate threat.
Now it needs to apply the same idea to its procurement processes. Not every program should be burdened by the full suite of rules and procedures designed for the most difficult acquisitions. Sometimes, a simpler method, a minimum viable process, is good enough (and saves time).
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review had blunt conclusions on acquisition: existing processes were not suitable; high-priority projects were taking too long; Defence remained overly risk-averse; and the skills required to deliver major programs were lacking. These issues go directly to our ability to convert strategic intent into real capability at speed.
The review introduced the important concept of minimum viable capability. For each program, senior officials and officers, with agreement by the government, specify the lowest acceptable performance from the desired system. This helps avoid the endless pursuit of perfection that adds months, or years, to capability delivery and eats up budgets. More importantly, it connects procurement activity to strategic need. Without that connection, procurement becomes a process in search of an outcome rather than a tool to achieve one.
Since the review, Defence has not been idle. A new National Defence Strategy was released in 2024. Force structures have changed. Capability priorities have been reset across long-range strike, amphibious forces, sea denial, cyber and theatre logistics. The Integrated Investment Plan, the National Defence Strategy’s accompanying spending plan, has been recast. Projects have been created, delayed or descoped, and new industry development priorities have been announced. Defence is also increasingly placing orders without holding a competition, where appropriate, and using relationship-based contracts (agreements that focus on co-operation, joint problem solving, and shared objectives between the buyer and the seller) in areas such as guided weapons and battle management systems.
Despite these changes, procurement tools remain largely aligned to pre-review thinking. The Commonwealth Procurement Rules have not materially shifted, and Defence contracting templates remain lengthy and complex. Skilling, risk management practices and related behaviours show little evidence of transformation. The result is a system that still plans for procurement timelines measured in years, even when the strategic environment demands months.
The One Defence Capability System illustrates the challenge. It is a comprehensive governance framework, tightly controlled through several approval gates and stakeholder touchpoints. While it provides oversight, it also adds friction. Transitions between phases are heavily gated, and project delays accumulate. What should be an excellent governance tool has become, in practice, a handbrake on speed to capability.
If Defence is serious about accelerating acquisition, it must look beyond its traditional tools and consider alternative approaches, without compromising probity or value for money.
One useful illustration comes from well outside the defence context. In 2020, a Swiss casino, entertainment and real estate company began a procurement process for a replacement enterprise resource planning system. This system enabled its key operations and management processes, and was central to its business. From business-case approval to vendor selection took four weeks. The actual source selection took two days.
This wasn’t achieved by abandoning rigour. Working out exactly what was required took six months and would have been familiar to anyone who had worked in Defence projects during pre-gate approval activities. What proved decisive was the first step: clearly articulating the high-level business need and its strategic purpose. That single sentence guided the entire procurement.
The buyer then assembled a cross-functional team with the authority to design the procurement and select the vendor. Three vendors were invited—not bid teams, but decision-makers and solution developers. They were brought together in a collaborative environment to develop and demonstrate technical solutions in front of competitors. Only pricing discussions were held separately.
This facilitated greater transparency, better identification of technical risks, improved solution quality and genuine competition. The successful vendor was selected without protest. The system went live on time and under budget. From a federal procurement perspective, the process delivered value for money, transparency and effective competition.
The lesson for Defence is not to copy a private-sector model wholesale but to recognise that process design matters. Speed to capability is enabled by speed to acquisition, and speed to acquisition is enabled by fit-for-purpose processes.
This is where minimum viable process becomes critical. Every procurement is unique. Rather than defaulting to a blanket approach, Defence should design procurement processes around what is essential to make informed, risk-aware decisions. That starts with clearly articulating the strategic need that the capability is meant to satisfy, something that can be expressed in a single sentence.
From there, meaningful evaluation criteria can be set, contracts can be tailored to actual risk, and industry can be engaged with clarity about what Defence needs and why. Risks will still emerge, including after contract signature. But disciplined risk and contract management, underpinned by strong records and probity, can address those risks without paralysing delivery. Defence needn’t wait for wholesale reform of procurement rules or process to move faster. The strategic review didn’t say that speed required new rules; it said it required new outcomes. Many of the tools already exist. What is required is the confidence and skill to use them differently.
